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Messaging without a Message: Executive Value and Social Media 
Activity  
 
 
Abstract 
We show that executives who start tweeting benefit from better career options. We 
motivate this finding using the well-established theory of limited attention. Consistent with this 
explanation, we find that content is irrelevant. Comparative statics are also consistent with our 
framework. In particular, the effect of Twitter is greater for executives who were largely 
unrecognized and who were underpaid before they started tweeting, who garner greater public 
attention from their social media activity, who enjoy higher professional mobility, and who 
operate in environments where compensation setting is less structured.  
 
Key words: limited attention; social media; Twitter 
JEL: G02; J01; J30; M51; O35   
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I. Introduction 
What drives the market value of executives and their compensation? Traditionally, the 
literature has suggested two basic explanations. The first postulates that managerial labor 
markets are largely efficient and that managerial compensation reflects executive marginal 
value. In contrast, the rent-seeking view posits that executives, CEOs in particular, are able to 
entrench themselves in their organizations and, once they have reached this objective, are able 
to extract compensation that goes beyond their marginal contribution. Empirically, prior 
research supports both views. On average, executive compensation appears to reflect 
managerial contribution, but this relation breaks down in firms in which corporate governance 
is weak (e.g., Chang, Dasgupta, and Hilary 2010). In both frameworks, managerial quality is 
reasonably well-observed and, absent material governance issues, is reflected in executive 
contracts. In particular, there is no a priori reason for executives to receive compensation below 
their marginal product.  
We rely on behavioral literature and more specifically on theories of limited attention 
to propose a third framework that complements the previous two. Limited attention is the idea 
that humans confront a great wealth of signals that are costly to process. There is a limit to the 
amount of information contracting parties can process, and therefore salient information 
receives disproportionate attention. Psychology literature (e.g., Kahneman 1973; Fiske and 
Taylor 1991) has shown that these two cognitive biases matter in individual decision making. 
Economists have also built on these concepts. For example, Camerer (2003) lists limited 
attention as an important topic for behavioral economics. Gabaix (2017) considers it to be a 
central, unifying theme for much of behavioral economics. Given that individuals have limited 
attention to fully inspect the properties of goods and services, it is natural to expect their 
valuation to be inaccurate at times. Most of the literature on this topic focuses on asset pricing 
considerations, showing how investors underreact to some information but overreact to other 
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information (e.g., Huberman and Regev 2001; Corwin and Coughenour 2008). Parallel 
literature in accounting demonstrates how firms can exploit these effects (e.g., Hirshleifer and 
Teoh 2003; Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh 2004).  
We expect human capital to be similarly mispriced. The executive labor market is broad, 
and the marginal contribution of an executive is difficult to ascertain (e.g., Holmstrom 1982; 
Wade, O’Reilly, and Pollock 2006). Thus, we expect that perceptions and heuristics are 
important factors when boards decide which executives they want to attract and retain. In 
particular, when faced with limited attention capacity and complex choices, employers are 
likely to favor individuals with more prominent profiles. Consequently, executives who are 
unable to generate sufficient public attention may be undervalued, even if they perform well 
objectively. Conversely, saliency has been shown to affect the value of items that are bought 
and sold. Thus, we expect the market value of an executive to increase when there is greater 
public awareness of her existence, in part because this increased notoriety should lead to better 
outside options for her. In other words, we hypothesize that creating greater notoriety beyond 
current employers gives executives more leverage in their current positions. We also predict 
the benefit to be concentrated among executives who are underappreciated (before engaging in 
social media activity), among individuals who are able to move to other organizations, and in 
settings in which executive searches are less systematic.  
Our results support our predictions. Specifically, we use the executive’s personal 
tweeting activity as a source of variation in the public attention to identify the effect of limited 
attention on executive value. First, we find that initiating personal tweeting activity increases 
executive compensation, even after controlling for variations in firm performance and value. 
The benefits are stronger when managers enjoy more followers, and when these followers are 
more focused (i.e., follow a small number of other Twitter accounts). Our findings are robust 
to different alternative empirical specifications and methods. In particular, our conclusions are 
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not affected by (1) various instrumental variable approaches, (2) different matched sample 
approaches, (3) a parallel trend analysis, and (4) several panel specifications that control for 
time-invariant and slow-moving characteristics (such as executive ability or psychological 
characteristics). The results also hold when we control for both personal and firm media 
coverage, the size of the personal social network “in real life” (obtained through employment, 
education, and other activities), firm transparency, governance, and for presence on other 
personal social media platforms (e.g., Facebook and LinkedIn). A Monte Carlo placebo test 
suggests an omitted variable would have to be extremely correlated with our treatment variable 
to explain our results.  
Importantly, our comparative statics are consistent with the limited attention framework 
in several ways. First, the positive effect of Twitter is the greatest for managers who are not 
well known before initiating tweeting activity, such as those who are not CEOs, who are 
infrequently researched on Google, or who were recently appointed as executives. In other 
words, the benefit of tweeting is greatest in samples where we expect the demand for attention 
to be highest.  Second, we show that executives who use attention-enhancing techniques benefit 
more from their social media activity. For example, managers who tweet more frequently, 
facilitate retweeting (by using hashtags in their posts), and use directed tweets (i.e., tweets that 
use the @ function to link with high-profile accounts) derive greater benefit from their activity.     
Aside from establishing the baseline results, we find that managers are able to garner 
better career options but that this effect is more significant when executive searches are less 
systematic and focused. First, the effect of Twitter is concentrated in executives who are 
underpaid (compared with their peers) before engaging in Twitter activity. However, the 
benefit of tweeting disappears when the low compensation is the consequence of systematic 
benchmarking. For example, the benefit of tweeting is lower for executives who work for 
companies that use compensation consultants. Also consistent with the notion that attention 
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matters, the benefits of tweeting are greater when board members are “busier” (and do not use 
consultants). These samples without clear benefits suggest that not all executives have 
incentives to tweet. Second, executives who start tweeting secure better outside options. For 
example, they sit on more boards outside their current employer. Consistent with the notion 
that systematic searches weaken the benefit of tweeting, these new positions are concentrated 
among private companies, where searches are more likely to be ad hoc and more subject to 
attention biases. However, the internal benefits of tweeting are limited to executives who are 
professionally mobile (i.e., they operate in states with the weak enforcement of non-compete 
provisions). This result shows that executives who are unable to capitalize on these outside 
options are not experiencing a pay increase. Lastly, we document that tweeting managers are 
more likely to be promoted to a CEO position (but the compensation increase is incremental to 
the promotion). Overall, tweeting increases an executive’s outside opportunities, leading to a 
better bargaining position of tweeting executives.   
Although it is possible to find alternative explanations for some of these tests 
independently, it is harder to find one that can fit all of our results simultaneously. By 
establishing multiple conditional relationships, these different tests impose an empirical 
structure that reduces the likelihood that a correlated omitted variable explains our findings. 
For example, any omitted variable would have to be correlated in such way that it can 
simultaneously explain our results based on the level of professional mobility, the number of 
prior Google searches, the focused nature of the following, the debilitating effect of 
compensation consultants, the “busyness” of the employer, and the use of directed tweets. It 
would also have to account for a differential effect on public and private boards. 
As with any empirical study, our approach may be affected by endogeneity. Aside from 
noting the multiple comparative statics and ancillary results, we address this concern in 
different ways. First, we note that academic research (e.g., Toubia and Stephen 2013) has 
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shown that individuals start tweeting simply to enjoy the activity. In other words, obtaining 
personal benefits (such as improved career prospects) does not seem to be the primary driver 
behind the decision to start tweeting in the general population. Second, we find that the decision 
to initiate personal activity on Twitter is uncorrelated with ex ante indicators of positive career 
outcomes. For example, tweeting activity (e.g., the decision to open a Twitter account, the 
number of tweets posted, or the use of directed tweets and hash tags) is uncorrelated with past 
changes in compensation, with past levels of compensation, or with the multiple characteristics 
that enhance the expected benefits of tweeting. Executives who would benefit more from 
tweeting do not engage more in the activity. Third, personal tweets contain limited information. 
Reading tweets and conducting a more systematic analysis indicate that most of the personal 
tweets in our sample are indeed devoid of economic content. An overwhelming majority of the 
tweets are very informal. For example, only 2% contain formal business-related keywords (as 
defined in Boone, Schumann, and White 2015), and 3% mention an executive’s employer. This 
lack of economic substance is unsurprising given that executives are subject to Security 
Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations and other laws that put strong constraints on what 
can publicly be discussed. In contrast to conference calls (e.g., Li et al. 2012) or television 
interviews (e.g., Kim and Meshke 2014), the average market reaction on tweeting days is not 
statistically different from that on non-tweeting days. Finally, some practitioners  (McGregor 
2017) has suggested that the use of executive’s Twitter account for corporate public relations 
is rather infrequent. Even if executives post tweets evoking elements that might be favorable 
to their employers (e.g., various corporate actions, social engagement, or employee diversity), 
or are part of a concerted campaign with their employer, we find that these elements are not 
sufficiently material to affect firms’ current or future economic performance and valuation. 
This last finding also suggests that executives do not start tweeting ahead of positive news for 
their employer that could affect their compensation indirectly.  
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We note that our framework is predicated on the notion that tweeting helps undervalued 
managers compensate for the limited attention from which they suffer. This in turn allows them 
to generate more outside offers and to improve their internal bargaining position. This 
framework does not generate strong priors regarding whether the managers understand the 
benefit of tweeting ex ante. Executives can start tweeting because they actively engage in self-
promotion, because they enjoy the activity for idiosyncratic reasons (and thus reap the benefit 
unexpectedly), or even because they want to help their employer (and receive some personal 
benefit indirectly). Our goal is not to distinguish between these possibilities. Irrespective of 
their motivation, we find that the main predictions of the framework are validated by the data. 
However, the results discussed in the paragraph above are more consistent with the notion that 
executives, on average, initiate tweets for idiosyncratic reasons historically. It is certainly 
possible that they may start using Twitter more strategically as its benefits have become more 
well-known. We also do not claim that tweeting is the best or only way to raise an executive’s 
profile. However, this medium has broad appeal, and the restriction to 140 characters reduces 
the likelihood that anything substantial is disclosed (our empirical results support this prior).  
This allows us to focus on the effect of attention rather than on information extraction that may 
lead to learning about executives’ marginal productivity.   
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section II, we develop our 
hypothesis. We discuss our data and sample in Section III and explain our empirical design in 
Section IV. We present our baseline results in Section V. We also analyze the potential effects 
of endogeneity in this section. We review the results from our comparative statistical analysis 
in Section VI and additional analysis in Section VII. In Section VIII, we investigate alternative 
explanations. Section IX concludes the paper.  
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II. Hypothesis Development 
Humans are cognitively bounded. In particular, there is a limit to the number of signals 
the brain can process and internalize. Hence, attention is selective and requires effort. To use 
economic terminology, processing information is costly and takes cognitive energy away from 
other tasks (e.g., Kahneman 1973). As noted by Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) among others, 
cognitive effort is required to both encode environmental stimuli (e.g., corporate performance 
announcements) and process ideas in conscious thought (e.g., the appraisal of the value of an 
executive). Dukas (2004) provides a review of the neuro-biological, psychological, and 
evolutionary mechanisms explaining limited attention, noting (p. 197) that “the neurobiological 
mechanisms underlying limited attention have been widely studied” and that research suggests 
“limited attention is an optimal strategy that balances effective yet economical search for 
cryptic objects.” 
The effect of limited attention is studied in the finance literature, but mainly from an 
asset pricing perspective. The basic tenet of this line of research, at least since Merton (1987), 
is that the value of a security increases with investor recognition. This effect is stronger when 
the asset is more idiosyncratic (e.g., Lehavy and Sloan 2008). As noted by Odean (1999) and 
Barber and Odean (2008), investors do not buy all stocks that catch their attention; for the 
most part, however, they buy only stocks that do. We hypothesize that a similar mechanism 
applies to human capital and, more specifically, to executive value. We argue, similarly to 
Merton (1987) but applied to a different context, that gathering information about an asset 
(human capital in our case) requires cognitive resources and that this cognitive effort may be 
better spent following only a few items (executives, in our setting). Boards do not hire all 
executives who catch their attention, but they do not hire executives of whom they are unaware. 
Naturally, this has implications for the welfare of these executives; the less salient their profile, 
the lower their market value. As their notability increases, executives benefit from a growing 
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potential demand for their talent. Consequently, previously underappreciated managers 
generate greater external employment options and enjoy greater market value.  
We hypothesize that a presence on social media, such as on Twitter, increases executive 
recognition among directors and headhunters and therefore generates more options for these 
executives. This theoretical framework conceivably applies to social media channels other than 
Twitter (such as Facebook or LinkedIn). For example, Jobvite (2014) shows that 93% of 
recruiters review a candidate’s social profile before making a hiring decision and 55% of 
recruiters reconsider a candidate based on her social profile (e.g., profanity, spelling/grammar, 
reference to alcohol, or sexually explicit posts). However, Jobvite notes that Twitter is one of 
the Top 3 social networks used to screen job candidates across industries.1 A recent survey 
indicates that two thirds of Fortune 500 CEOs who use social media focus on one platform.2 
Among all the major networks, Twitter is the second-most popular social media platform, 
behind LinkedIn but ahead of Facebook, Google+, and Instagram. In contrast with Twitter, the 
percentage of CEOs on LinkedIn has decreased in recent years. Academic research (e.g., 
Toubia and Stephen 2013) has recognized the popularity of Twitter and its rapid audience 
growth. Twitter has also become a major component of advertising campaigns. For example, 
according to surveys, 74% of polled marketers indicate that brand managers use Twitter as a 
social media channel in their advertising campaigns.3 Toubia and Stephen (2013) also show 
that posting content on Twitter is a way for users to attract new followers (and hence to 
presumably raise their profile). 
Aside from its popularity, focusing on personal tweets by executives allows us to better 
isolate the effect of limited attention for several reasons. First, it is harder to convey 
                                                          
1 More information available at http://www.jobvite.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/RecruiterNation2016.pdf. 
2 More information about the report is available at http://www.ceo.com/social-ceo-report-2014/. 
3 See http://www.exactdrive.com/news/advertising-spend-trends-on-facebook-twitter-and-youtube. 
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economically relevant information in the 140 characters of a tweet; one can post richer and 
more informative texts on Facebook and LinkedIn. Twitter allows focus on the more attention-
grabbing part of social media activity (as opposed to the communication of information, for 
example, regarding their employers). This activity is free and does not require approval from 
outside parties (in contrast to appearances on television programs, publishing newspaper 
articles, or speaking at conventions, for example). It does not require much time, and extremely 
busy elected officials find the time to engage with it. A second explanation is that the reasons 
for initiating Twitter activity have been researched in the marketing field. For example, Toubia 
and Stephen (2013) find that social media users go through two phases “where intrinsic utility 
posting is larger than image-related utility when they have fewer followers but image-related 
utility becomes larger than intrinsic utility as they amass more followers.” In other words, their 
results indicate that many individuals start tweeting because “it is fun to communicate this way 
with other people in the community” but may continue after finding an audience because “my 
contribution shows others that I am a clever consumer.” Thus, an individual’s decision to 
initiate activity on Twitter appears to be unrelated to career concerns (we provide additional 
support for this hypothesis below). For example, executives post such things as photos from an 
afternoon baseball game family pictures, or holiday season’s greetings. This is less likely to be 
the case for LinkedIn (a business- and employment-oriented social networking service) or 
Facebook.   
Our basic hypothesis is that an increase in notability should lower biases associated 
with limited attention problems and improve the bargaining position of executives. Although 
our motivation relies on a well-established theory, it is not a foregone empirical conclusion that 
it applies to our setting.  It is possible that firms, especially large listed ones, dedicate such a 
large amount of resources to executive search and compensation setting that the attention 
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constraint is not binding in most cases. Whether this is the case or not remains an empirical 
question.  
Note that this reasoning does not imply (though neither does it preclude) that directors 
and headhunters are able to explicitly attribute the increase in recognition to Twitter. Similarly, 
our prediction neither implies nor precludes that executives initiate tweeting for strategic 
reasons (such as obtaining a promotion). In fact, academic marketing research suggests that 
many individuals start tweeting because they derive intrinsic utility from this activity and 
subsequently discover the potential benefit for their image.  
 
III. Data and Sample 
We obtained compensation data from Execucomp, financial information from 
Compustat, stock market data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database, 
and personal characteristics from BoardEx. To maintain the labor-intensive analysis of the 
tweeting activity at a manageable level, we started from a complete list of executives from 
Execucomp who served as a CEO at some point during the 2006–2014 period (Twitter was 
founded in 2006). Execucomp covers the S&P 1500 and companies that were once part of the 
S&P 1500 index and are still trading. Overall, 3,933 executives worked as CEOs at least once 
in a year during the sample period. This focus on CEOs is consistent with numerous studies in 
the literature (e.g., Edmans et al. 2017). Next, we manually checked the names of these 
managers using the search engine provided by Twitter (https://twitter.com/search-home) and 
obtained a list of accounts that match the managers on our list by executive names. 
We then physically read tweets and other related information to determine whether each 
account is valid and accessible. We define “valid and accessible” using the following criteria: 
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(1) the Twitter account does indeed belong to the manager in question who served as a CEO at 
some point after opening her account, which we determine by cross-checking name, gender, 
company information, and profile picture; and (2) the account allows public access, and 
therefore its tweets are visible to outsiders.4 We use the Twitter application program interface 
(API) to retrieve the full text of each tweet issued.5 We characterize an account as active if the 
executive posts more than three tweets in a year over our sample period. This procedure yields 
a treatment sample of 101 managers with valid, accessible, and active personal Twitter 
accounts and for whom we can obtain the necessary data to conduct our tests.  
To construct our control sample, we focus on the remaining executives who served as 
CEOs (at some point) since 2008 (the first personal Twitter account among the executives in 
our treated sample appeared in 2008). In other words, our treatment and control samples are 
equally successful. We ensure that we have at least two years of observations before the 
initiation of Twitter activity to maintain a proper treatment period for these managers. We form 
our control sample with executives who either do not own a Twitter account or own an inactive 
one.6  Taken together, the above sampling procedure leads to 16,260 manager-years, in which 
101 are treatment managers (672 manager-years) and 2,640 are control managers (15,588 
manager-years).  
 
 
 
                                                          
4 We delete managers whose Twitter accounts meet one but not both criteria, but our results are not sensitive to 
this design choice.  
5 More information about the Twitter API is available at https://dev.twitter.com/rest/public. This utility provides 
the most recent 3,200 tweets for any given Twitter account. Only four executives in our sample had more than 
3,200 tweets. Our results are not affected if we exclude those four executives. 
6 Our results are not affected if we drop those managers who have a Twitter account but are consistently not active 
in Twitter from the control sample. 
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IV. Research Design 
We begin our analysis by testing the prediction that being active on Twitter helps 
managers obtain higher compensation. Specifically, we estimate the following generalized 
difference-in-difference model: 
Compi,j,t = α0 + α1 Twitteri,t + αk Xi,j,t + γj+ σn + εi,j,t (1) 
   
where Comp is the total annual compensation of a manager in a given year, including salary, 
bonus, other annual compensation, total value of restricted stock granted, fair value of stock 
options granted, long-term incentive payouts, and all other pay. As compensation data are 
highly skewed, we follow prior studies (e.g., Cadman, Carter, and Hillegeist 2010) and 
calculate Comp by taking the natural logarithm of the total annual compensation (in thousands 
of dollars). However, our main results are not affected if we use the dollar value of annual 
compensation (untabulated). Our variable of interest is Twitter, an indicator variable that takes 
the value of 1 if a manager has her Twitter account active in place by the end of year t and 0 
otherwise.  
γj denotes firm fixed effects. σn denotes industry-year fixed effects (Fama and French 
48 classification). The firm fixed effects control for any time-invariant firm-level factors that 
affect the level of executive compensation (e.g., long-term corporate policy), and the industry-
year fixed effects account for time-varying industry effects.7 This research design essentially 
represents a difference-in-difference approach in which managers who have not opened their 
Twitter accounts in a given year serve as the control group for managers who have Twitter 
accounts in that year. The coefficient α1 is our difference-in-difference estimate, which captures 
the average Twitter effect for the treatment group relative to the control group. Specifically, 
                                                          
7 Our results are not affected if we include fixed effects based on lagged market capitalization deciles to control 
for the potential effect of peers of similar size (e.g., Focke, Maug, and Niessen-Ruenzi 2017).  
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we predict a positive coefficient on Twitter (α1) if the Twitter activity increases executive 
compensation. As Model (1) includes firm and industry-year fixed effects, the variation is 
purely within firms and industries, raising the bar for identifying the impact of Twitter on 
executive compensation. Our results are not affected if we replace firm and industry-year fixed 
effects with firm-year fixed effects (untabulated). 
Furthermore, we include a set of control variables (X). First, we control for various firm 
characteristics that affect the level of compensation. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets 
in place (e.g., Cadman, Carter, and Hillegeist 2010). ROA is income before extraordinary items 
scaled by total assets, as prior studies (e.g., Murphy 2000) show that accounting performance 
helps to determine executive pay. We also control for stock return, Return, to capture the effects 
of stock performance on compensation. MTB is the ratio of market value and book value of 
assets. Following prior studies (e.g., Core, Holthausen, and Larker 1999), we use this variable 
to control for growth opportunities. We expect compensation to be higher in firms that are 
larger, more profitable, and growing. In addition, consistent with other empirical research on 
compensation (e.g., Smith and Watts 1992; Core 1997), we include firm risk (RetVolt), 
measured by the standard deviation of a firm’s stock return in the regression. Theoretical 
models (e.g., Banker and Datar 1989) provide conflicting predictions on the direction of the 
relationship between risk and compensation, but Core et al. (1999) empirically find a negative 
relation. Next, we control for the executive’s position within her firm. Specifically, CEO is an 
indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if a manager currently serves as a CEO and 0 
otherwise. Tenure is the number of years the manager has been working as a CEO. We expect 
compensation to be higher for CEOs and for those with a longer tenure. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2966559 
16 
 
Standard errors are robust and allow for clustering at the industry level to mitigate the 
concern that Twitter activity is potentially correlated within industry. Our inferences do not 
change if we cluster observations at the firm or manager level or if we remove the clustering.8  
 
V. Baseline Empirical Results  
Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A of Table 1 reports the main summary statistics for our primary sample. Panel 
B reports the pair-wise correlation matrix. Consistent with our expectation, Twitter is 
significantly and positively correlated with Comp based on both Pearson and Spearman 
correlations. The univariate correlations between control variables are low, suggesting that 
multi-collinearity is not a severe concern in our tests. To confirm this, we examine the variance 
inflation factors (VIF) in our different specifications and find that they are all below 
conventional levels (untabulated).  
To reduce the influence of outliers, control variables with continuous values are 
winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. However, the untabulated results suggest that outliers 
are still present. This issue is common in the studies of executive compensation (e.g., Guthrie, 
Sokolowsky, and Wan 2012). To mitigate this problem, we exclude observations with a 
DFBETA diagnostic value greater than 0.05 (e.g., Belsely, Kuh, Welsch 2005). This method 
addresses outliers in both the dependent variable space (i.e., vertical outliers) and the 
independent variable one (i.e., bad leverage points). It has been used in prior literature (e.g., 
Sedor 2002; Dee, Lulseged, and Nowlin 2005; Munk, Bonke, and Hussain 2016). Our results 
are more significant if we do not exclude any outliers. Our conclusions are also unaffected if 
                                                          
8 The falsification test in Section 3 further explains why the choice of clustering does not affect our inferences (e.g., Bertrand 
et al. 2004; Rosenbaum 2002, 2009).  
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we drop observations of when executive compensation (TDC1) for the year (1) is extremely 
low (e.g., does not exceed 1, 100, or 1,000 dollars), or (2) is greater than two standard 
deviations of the sample mean (Song and Wan 2017).  
Our final sample includes 2,732 managers, composed of 97 treatment managers (578 
manager-years) and 2,635 control managers (15,560 manager-years). The untabulated results 
show that the number of managers with Twitter accounts increased from 0 in 2006 (2 
executives in 2008) to 4% of our sample at the end of our sampling period (2014). We also use 
econometric techniques to mitigate the concern that an unbalanced panel may affect our results 
(we describe them in greater depth in Section V).  
 
Baseline Results 
We present the main results in Panel A of Table 2. In column (1), we regress Comp on 
Twitter with firm and industry-year fixed effects. In column (2), we further include firm and 
individual characteristics that could be correlated with pay. The estimated coefficient on 
Twitter is significant at the 1% level and fairly stable across the two columns. In column (3), 
we include Twitter_Firm, an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm (as opposed 
to the executive) has a valid and active Twitter account in year t and 0 otherwise. The 
(untabulated) correlation between Twitter and Twitter_Firm is weak (0.09). Twitter_Firm is 
insignificant, and the point estimate of the coefficient associated with Twitter is left essentially 
unaffected when we include this variable in the regression. In addition, our conclusions remain 
unaffected when we replace firm fixed effects with executive effects (columns 4 and 5). In 
terms of economic significance, initiating activity on Twitter is associated with an increase in 
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compensation of approximately 10% of its mean value.9 10 This increase is approximately 
translated to 14% of the economic effect associated with being named CEO. 
Our results (untabulated) are not affected when we focus only on the log of salary or 
measure the option value using the realized total compensation instead of the fair value of stock 
options granted.11 The results also hold when we lag the control variables by one period. In 
addition, we conduct a set of additional analyses to rule out the possibility that the link between 
compensation and Twitter arises because of individual-level omitted variables. The results are 
not affected after controlling for an extensive list of specific observable individual-level 
variables that are related to executive compensation. For example, including the executive’s 
personal characteristics, such as education, age, gender, and chairperson position, the size of 
the executive’s personal network, and the number of news articles about the executive in six 
major business publications, does not change the conclusions.12 The results continue to hold 
when we control for firm-level time-varying measures of corporate transparency, such as 
analyst forecast dispersion, analyst forecast errors, analyst following, the bid-ask spread, and 
abnormal accruals (Armstrong, Balakrishnan, and Cohen 2012). Finally, the results also hold 
when we control for state-level variables, such as the unemployment rate, level of or change in 
median household income, and the percentage of minorities in the population.  
                                                          
9 We calculate the economic effect as based on the exponential value of 0.095 (the coefficient on Twitter in Column 
4 of Table 2 Panel A) minus one. 
10 Studies conducted by practitioners (e.g., https://www.cnbc.com/2017/04/13/the-surprising-reason-why-ceos-
should-be-social-media-savvy.html) have found a correlation between CEO stable attributes and having a Twitter 
account.  Managerial fixed effects control for these potential effects.  As discussed below, our results are stronger 
when we focus on the managers who were not CEOs when they start tweeting. 
11 We use the TDC1 variable from Execucomp in our test. Using TDC2 in this robustness test does not affect our 
conclusions. 
12 Education is measured by the number of degrees at the undergraduate level and above from BoardEx. For 
example, an individual with a bachelor’s degree and a master’s degree would be coded as two. BoardEx provides 
the size of the personal social network. The network is measured by the number of overlapping organizations and 
activities of a manager with others through employment, education, and other activities. For example, an 
individual who has worked with five executives in the same company, studied with 10 executives in the same 
college, and been a member of a golf club with two executives would be coded as 17. To count the number of a 
manager’s news articles, we searched Factiva for articles referring to the managers in our sample in The New York 
Times, BusinessWeek, Financial Times, The Wall Street Journal, The Economist, Fortune, and Forbes.  
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As discussed previously, there may be concern that our results are affected by the 
imbalance in the sample between tweeting and non-tweeting executives. We consider different 
techniques to address this issue. We start with an entropy balancing (EB) approach. EB is a 
reweighting procedure that directly incorporates covariate balance into the weight function. 
Specifically, the EB approach assigns a scalar weight to each sample unit such that the moments 
of the control variables for the reweighted control group equal the moments for the treatment 
group, creating a balanced sample for the subsequent estimation of the treatment effect 
(Hainmueller 2012; Hainmueller and Xu 2013). The EB approach reduces the effect of some 
potential misspecification (e.g., observable omitted variable) in the estimation of treatment 
effects (Abadie and Imbens 2007; Ho et al. 2007). We first use the EB method to balance the 
first three moments of the control variables: the mean, variance, and skewness. The results 
reported in Appendix A show that all three moments of the control variables for tweeting and 
non-tweeting managers become approximately equal with only a marginal difference after the 
EB procedure is implemented. This suggests that the level of homogeneity between treatment 
and control samples is high. Next, we follow prior studies (e.g., Robins, Rotnitzky, and Zhao 
1995; Hirano and Imbens 2001) and re-estimate Model (1). Columns (5) and (6) in Panel A 
shows that Twitter remains significant and the magnitude of the coefficient is not affected.  
We perform various robustness checks to further ensure that the imbalanced panel is 
not problematic. First, we create a matched sample using a nearest-neighbor propensity score 
matching technique. To this end, we follow Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and estimate a 
discrete-time hazard model that examines a manager’s choice to initiate a Twitter account. We 
include the control variables in Model (1) in the model and use the predicted probabilities from 
the model as the propensity score. We match each tweeting manager to the control manager 
with the closest propensity score with replacement (using 0.05 as the caliper distance) to form 
a sample of treated and control managers within the same calendar year. Next, we repeat our 
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analysis using an inverse probability weighting procedure (e.g., Hirano, Imbens, and Ridder 
2003; Busso, DiNardo, and McCrary 2014). We follow previous studies (Rosenbaum and 
Rubin 1983; Imbens and Rubin 2014) and use the estimated propensity score to weight the 
outcome variable. Finally, we follow Hainmueller (2012) and combine a propensity score 
technique and the EB method to achieve greater overlap between the treatment and control 
groups. We repeat our EB approach using the sample after removing extreme observations with 
no common support (propensity scores are not within the 1 and 99 percentiles). The untabulated 
results indicate that our results from the preceding robustness checks are not affected. 
 
Endogeneity 
A perennial issue with much of the empirical literature in applied economics is 
endogeneity. We address this issue below with multiple empirical approaches. However, before 
discussing the details of these approaches, we examine whether the data are consistent with 
endogeneity in our setting. We stress that this part of the analysis is not central to what we test. 
First, we note that we focus on personal rather than company-initiated tweets. As 
discussed above, prior studies (e.g., Blankespoor, Miller, and White 2014;  Lee, Hutton, and 
Shu 2015; Al Guindy 2016; Jung, Naughton, Tahoun, and Wang 2017) show that company-
initiated tweets mostly contain corporate disclosures that attenuate market reactions to negative 
news, increase transparency, reduce the cost of capital, and improve stock liquidity. As 
discussed above, firm and executive tweeting activities are very weakly correlated. Research 
(e.g., Bartov, Faurel, and Mohanram 2017) has also shown that analysis of market sentiment 
using an extremely large number of tweets posted by individuals unaffiliated with the company 
(the “wisdom of crowds”) can predict a firm’s future. Our focus is on personal tweets issued 
by executives who are subject to SEC regulations and other laws that put strong constraints on 
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what they can publicly discuss. However, the marketing research we discuss above suggests 
that the primary reason for initiating personal tweeting activity is its intrinsic value (i.e., “it is 
fun to communicate this way with other people in the community”). This finding suggests that 
the decision is largely exogenous with respect to the increase in compensation that we study.   
We conduct multiple additional tests to buttress this claim. First, we read a large cross-
section of personal tweets. Most are conversational, very casual, and devoid of economic 
meaning. For example, Karl McDonnell (an executive at Strayer Education, Inc) indicated the 
following in his first tweet: “Just signed up for Twitter....looking forward to writing about all 
sorts of useless things...” Conversely, we did not identify any highly controversial materials.13 
We provide a selection of examples in Appendix B. Similarly, a majority of our tweeting 
managers do not use a formal profile picture but mention their personal hobbies on their Twitter 
page. Our results are not affected if we exclude managers who use a formal profile picture or 
do not mention their hobbies (untabulated). 
Next, the untabulated results indicate that the average market reaction (measured by the 
trading volume and absolute value of return) on tweeting days is not statistically different from 
the reaction on non-tweeting days.14 This lack of market reaction is also present in sub-samples.  
For example, we observe no difference if we focus on tweets that contain a business keyword 
(Boone, Schumann, and White 2015), mention the employer, mention a CNBC interview, have 
an embed hyperlink to another document (e.g., video, webpage, and picture), are directed at a 
large account, contain a hashtag, or that are retweeted. Next, even if the average reaction to 
tweets is zero, we expect to observe executives for whom the tweets appear correlated with 
                                                          
13 Practitioners seem to concur on this point.  For example, a Washington Post article by Jena McGregor published 
on June 6, 2017 cite a consultant as saying “…we don't really see a lot of big gaffes out there by Fortune 500 
CEOs on social media.” 
14 Chen, Hwang, and Liu (2016) find a small (-0.07%) negative reaction in the three days after a CEO or a CFO 
posts a tweet with a high fraction of negatively connoted words. This initial reaction is followed by a subsequent 
reversal in the next three days.  
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market activity (if only by chance). However, we find that the beneficial effect of tweeting on 
executive compensation is not significantly different for managers with high and low tweet 
price impacts (the p-value equals 0.76).15 This result further supports the idea that the career-
related benefits of tweeting are not related to the communication of value-relevant information. 
Next, we examine whether executives are more likely to tweet when they expect to 
derive more benefit from their activity. First, we create a first indicator variable that takes the 
value of 1 if an executive is not a CEO and the current CEO is close to retirement (i.e., at least 
60 years old) and zero otherwise. We create a second indicator that takes the value of one if an 
executive is not a CEO and the current CEO changed in the year t-1, 0 otherwise. We then 
regress Twitter on both variables and on the control variables present in Model (1). The 
untabulated results indicate that the coefficient on both variables is insignificant. Second, we 
regress Twitter on an indicator variable indicating that the CEO has changed in a window that 
starts two years earlier and finishes two years later. This indicator variable is also insignificant. 
Third, we create a score based on the different partitioning variables (used in comparative 
statics) that are shown to be associated additional benefits for managers who tweet. We form a 
variable ExpBenef based on five specific characteristics.16 We then regress Twitter on ExpBenef, 
controlling for our standard vector of variables present in Model (1). The untabulated results 
indicate that the coefficient on ExpBenef is insignificant, showing that managers who are 
expected to benefit the most from tweeting do not tweet more. This result is consistent with 
some practitioner studies (e.g., McGregor 2017) suggesting that CEOs do not tweet more 
because “they don’t understand its return on investment.” We also examine whether the level 
                                                          
15 We measure the tweet impact using either the trading volume or the absolute value of the return on the tweeting 
dates. We use the median as the breakpoint.  
16 Specifically, we consider managers’ pre-tweeting pay level, tenure, reputation as measured by the frequency of 
being searched on Google, positions they have held, their potential job mobility as measured by the stringency of 
non-compete provisions, and the use of compensation consulting. Using the sample of managers who initiated 
tweeting, we regress the changes in compensation after tweeting on the above five variables. We then use the 
parameters from the regression to estimate the expected benefit of tweeting for all managers.  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2966559 
23 
 
of historical compensation drives the initiation of Twitter activity. Specifically, we regress 
Twitter on averaged lagged changes (from years t-3 to t-1) in Comp and on the control variables 
present in Model (1). Alternatively, we use the lagged level of compensation (from t-3 to t-1). 
These lagged values are insignificant, indicating that the tweeting activity is not affected by 
past trends in executive pay. We obtain similar results in the above tests if we use the number 
of tweets, the number of directed tweets, and the frequency of hashtags used as the dependent 
variable instead of Twitter. 
Next, there may be concern that the activity on Twitter is correlated with a broader 
public relations campaign orchestrated for the promotion of executives. We note that if true, 
this would not invalidate our main hypothesis, which is that the executive market suffers from 
biases induced by limited attention. However, we find only 3% of the personal tweets use one 
of the keywords regarding other media exposures (e.g., “interview,” “press,” “TV,” 
“convention”) and that less than 3% mention the executive’s employer. Our results hold if we 
exclude these observations. 
Finally, it is possible that the tweets enhance firm value, for example by improving the 
company image, which may indirectly increase executive compensation (e.g., Malhotra and 
Malhotra 2016). In this context, it is possible that specialized consultants write tweets on behalf 
of executives (Murphy and Sandino 2010; Rajgopal, Taylor, and Venkatachalam 2012). We 
note that this possibility would still be consistent with our main predictions. In addition, it is 
possible that executives start tweeting when they expect their employer to release positive news 
that may have an indirect increase on the executives’ compensation. To explore these 
possibilities, we regress various proxies of firm value (e.g., Tobin’s Q ratio, stock return, ROA, 
sales growth, and assets turnover in the following two years) on Twitter and the control 
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variables in Model (1). None of the proxies has a significant relationship with personal tweets.17 
This suggests that personal tweeting activity does not have a significant positive impact on firm 
value and firm performance (or is not timed ahead of positive developments). These results 
also show that any improvement in executive skills (that might be correlated with the Twitter 
activity) have no effect on firm performance.  
Taken together, these findings are consistent with the notion that initiating social 
activity on Twitter is fairly exogenous in our context. However, it is certainly possible that this 
finding was true historically but that executives and their employers have become more 
strategic as the benefits of tweeting have become better known. 
 
Time Series Dynamic and Placebo Tests 
The results from these numerous tests notwithstanding, we use additional approaches 
to address potential endogeneity. First, the baseline specification above provides little 
information on the dynamics of executive compensation. To explore this issue, we decompose 
Twitter into separate periods for each tweeting manager and create two new indicator variables 
(Prej and Postj, respectively). More specifically, we re-estimate our models from Model (1) by 
replacing Twitter with those decomposed variables. Prej (Postj) is an indicator variable that 
takes the value of 1 for exactly j years before (after) a manager opens her Twitter account and 
0 otherwise. Similarly, Post2+ is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 two years or 
more after a manager opens her Twitter account and 0 otherwise. The results in Panel B of 
Table 2 (column 1) show that the increase in Comp does not occur before Twitter activity is 
                                                          
17 The exception is sales growth, which is negatively associated with a tweeting activity in some specifications.  
This is in contrast to some survey results (based on “several hundred employees of diverse companies”) suggesting 
that a majority of these individuals believe that CEO participation on social media channels help enhance brand 
image (http://www.brandfog.com/CEOSocialMediaSurvey/BRANDfog_2012_CEO_Survey.pdf). 
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initiated. These results suggest that the parallel trend assumption behind our difference-in-
difference analysis is not problematic in our setting. Importantly, the coefficient on Post0 and 
Post1 are positive and significant, suggesting that the increase in Comp started after the 
executives initiated tweets. The effects continue to hold in the two years after a manager’s 
initiation of Twitter activity, reflected by the positive and significant coefficient on Post2+. 
This result suggests that the effect of Twitter is not short-lived.  
Second, our panel may suffer from the “Big N, Small T” problem that leads to 
inconsistent estimates (Arellano and Bond 1991). To ensure that fixed or slow-moving 
managerial characteristics are not driving the results, we estimate Model (1) without firm fixed 
effects. Instead, we include lagged compensation to account for other unobservable firm and 
managerial characteristics (Core et al. 1999). Since including lagged dependent variables in a 
dynamic panel can induce estimation biases, we follow the system generalized method of 
moments (GMM) procedure of Blundell and Bond (1998). The untabulated results indicate that 
this specification passes the Sargan and Arellano-Bond tests for zero autocorrelation. Column 
(2) in Panel C shows that the results continue to hold. This suggests that the results are likely 
not driven by time-invariant and slow-moving omitted variables (e.g., executive ability, 
psychological characteristics) or by a reverse causality issue.  
Third, we follow Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) and randomly select a set 
of manager x year cells, defining them as “pseudo twitter events.” We then estimate the 
baseline regression model using the pseudo Twitter events instead of real Twitter events and 
store the estimated coefficients from the pseudo regressions. The placebo tweeting distribution 
provides a way to conduct statistical inference with less restrictive assumptions than those 
required for standard methods. Based on 2,000 regressions with simulated data, we find that 
both the mean and media values of the placebo Twitter effect are zero. The observed estimate 
of the Twitter effect (as reported in Panel A of Table 2) falls in the extreme tail of the 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2966559 
26 
 
distribution of placebo effects. This suggests that our estimate of Twitter is extremely unlikely 
to have arisen by chance and that an omitted variable would have to be highly correlated with 
our treatment variable to explain our results.  
 
Instrumental Variables (IVs) 
We also consider different IV specifications to further rule out any remaining 
endogeneity concerns. Our instrument, Twitter_Popularity, is the percentage of managers in 
our entire sample (of 2,732 executives) who use Twitter accounts in a given US state at the 
beginning of a calendar year. We exclude the treated manager under consideration from the 
calculation of Twitter_Popularity (e.g., if five executives out of 10 present in the state tweet, 
the value of Twitter_Popularity is four divided by nine if the executive tweets and five divided 
by nine if she does not).  
Studies on social contagion show that geographic proximity is one of the key factors 
that predicts technology adoption because social learning about technology promotes its 
diffusion (e.g., Conley and Udry 2010). Consistent with this view, researchers find that the 
geographic distribution of individuals’ propensities to adopt social media and the preferences 
of peers who share similar tastes and geographic locations are crucial features in describing the 
adoption of Twitter (e.g., Takhteyev, Gruzd, and Wellman 2012; Toole, Cha, Gonzalez 2012). 
In addition, we do not see a clear reason for why the regional propensity among executives to 
adopt Twitter should affect managerial compensation, especially after controlling for firm and 
industry-year fixed effects. In other words, we expect the instrument to satisfy the exclusion 
criterion. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2966559 
27 
 
The untabulated statistics indicate that a higher proportion of users can be found in 
states such as South Carolina, West Virginia, and Montana, (with 14–26% of executives 
tweeting at some point). Some states do not have executives with an active Twitter account in 
our sample period (e.g., Alaska, Mississippi, and New Mexico). Large states, even those with 
a strong technology industry (e.g., California, Illinois, and New York) are in the middle of the 
distribution (with 3–5% of executives tweeting at some point). The average number of 
managers excluding the treated manager under consideration (i.e., the denominator of 
Twitter_Popularity) is about 56.  
To obtain a statistical assessment of the quality of our instrument, we follow Lewbel 
(2012). This approach allows the identification of structural parameters with endogenous 
regressors, even in the absence of external instruments (e.g., see Larcker 2003 for a positive 
discussion of this approach). Identification is achieved in this context by obtaining regressors 
that are uncorrelated with the product of heteroskedastic errors. Lewbel (2012) shows that this 
approach may be applied to supplement external instruments to improve the efficiency of the 
IV estimator. It allows us to examine the ancillary statistics associated with an over-identified 
system. We report the results from the Lewbel (2012) procedure in column (1) in Panel C of 
Table 3.  
Second, Wooldridge (2010) suggests that a three-step estimation is efficient when the 
variable of interest is binary. We follow his approach and first estimate a probit model in which 
Twitter is the dependent variable. We control for the variables in Model (1) and include our 
instrument, Twitter_Popularity. We obtain the fitted value from the probit model. We then use 
it as an instrument to obtain the IV estimators in the next two stages of regressions. In column 
(2), we use the Wooldridge three-stage approach with the Lewbel (2012) estimation procedure. 
Specifically, we use the probit method to obtain the fitted values, which are used as an external 
instrument in the Lewbel (2012) procedure.  
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Both approaches yield similar conclusions. The results are consistent with 
Twitter_Popularity being a relevant instrument. The results from the Lewbel procedure 
indicate that the Hansen J statistics are approximately 0.8, far above the 10% cutoff point for 
significance (column 1). This supports the validity of our instrument. In the first approach 
(column 1), the instrument (Twitter_Popularity) in the first stage regression is positive and 
significant (the untabulated t-statistic is 4.02). In the three-step approach (column 2), 
Twitter_Popularity is significantly positive in the first step (the untabulated z-statistic is 11.82). 
The fitted value is also significant in the second step (the untabulated z-statistic is 2.94). In 
both approaches, the Cragg-Donald F-statistic is approximately 900 (916 in one case, 899 in 
the other), well above the critical values of the Stock-Yogo weak ID test. This suggests the 
estimation does not suffer from weak instruments. Last and importantly, Twitter is significantly 
positive in both specifications, with z-statistics equal to 2.56, and 2.26, respectively. Our results 
also hold if we control for state-level variables such as the unemployment rate, level of or 
change in median household income, or percentage of minorities in the population. Thus, our 
findings are robust to using different IV specifications.  
 
Twitter Audience 
Next, we consider the effect of the Twitter audience, rather than the mere act of 
initiating a tweeting activity. To this end, we decompose Twitter into two sets of variables: 
High_Twitter and Low_Twitter. High_Twitter1/2 (Low_Twitter1/2) are a series of three sets of 
indicator variables measuring whether a manager has a large (small) number of followers on 
Twitter (High_Twitter1, Low_Twitter1), or is followed by focused (unfocused) accounts 
(High_Twitter2, Low_Twitter2). In each specification, the default case in this specification is a 
complete lack of Twitter activity.  
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First, we define a manager as having a large (small) number of followers if the number 
of followers is above (below) the value of the top tercile for all of the tweeting managers in our 
sample. Next, we define a manager as having a focused following if the median number of 
accounts followed by the executive’s audience (the secondary following) is below (above) the 
median value of secondary following for all of the tweeting managers in our sample. For 
example, if an account is followed by three people who are themselves following three, six, 
and nine accounts, the secondary following is six. As the median secondary following in our 
sample is 479, this executive would be coded as having a focused following. When a manager 
benefits from a more focused following, we expect her to garner greater attention. We then re-
estimate Model (1) by replacing Twitter with High_Twitter and Low_Twitter. We use the same 
set of independent variables as in column (2) in Panel A. Consistent with the notion that the 
benefits from Twitter are stronger for more visible accounts, the coefficients on High_Twitter 
are significantly greater than those on Low_Twitter in both cases (Panel D of Table 2). In other 
words, the Twitter audience matters for executive compensation. This finding reduces the 
likelihood that an omitted variable, such as a change in managerial mood or in training, explains 
our results. 
 
VI. Comparative Statics 
Next, we examine different comparative statics tests that are suggested by our limited 
attention framework. We do so to further examine whether limited attention explains the 
benefits of tweeting for managerial compensation and to further rule out the possibility that an 
unspecified correlated omitted variable explains our findings.  
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Attention Deficit 
Our limited attention framework suggests that managers who tweet when more people 
are paying attention should derive a greater benefit from their social media activity. Consistent 
with this claim, the benefit of tweeting is greater if managers are followed by a larger audience. 
However, we expect the impact of Twitter to be moderated by the pre-existing level of attention. 
Specifically, we expect Twitter to have a more limited effect for managers suffering from a 
smaller attention deficit (i.e., those who are already well known may face a declining marginal 
return on their online activity). To test these predictions, we consider three proxies for a pre-
existing level of attention deficit (Attention_Deficit). Specifically, we create four indicator 
variables based on (1) whether the executive is not a CEO, (2) whether the frequency of Google 
searches using the executive name as a keyword is smaller than the upper tercile of the 
frequency, and (3) whether the length of tenure at the firm is smaller than the upper tercile of 
the length. All three variables are based on the status in the year before the initiation of the 
activity on Twitter. 18  We then interact each indicator variable with Twitter. The results 
presented in Panel A of Table 3 are consistent with expectations. In particular, they indicate 
that the benefit of Twitter is concentrated among executives with a low pre-existing level of 
notoriety.  
 
Tweeting for Attention 
Next, we examine whether the benefit of Twitter is greater when executives use 
techniques that maximize its impact. To this end, we consider three proxies. First, we expect a 
manager to obtain greater attention when she tweets more frequently. Second, as the usage of 
                                                          
18 Using the CEO’s status at the time of the tweets does not affect our results. 
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the hashtag (i.e., “#”) in tweets can increase impact, we expect that a greater use of hashtags 
provides greater recognition. Third, we expect a manager who issues more directed tweets (i.e., 
tweets using the @ function to link with high-profile accounts) to attract more attention and 
thus expect her tweets to have a greater impact on her notoriety and career.  
To empirically test these conjectures, we create two indicator variables. High_ 
Attention_Twitter equals 1 if a manager with Twitter activity (Twitter=1) uses techniques to 
increase her profile and 0 otherwise. If the executive is engaged in tweeting but does not often 
use one of the attention-enhancing techniques, Low_Attention_Twitter is coded as 1 and 0 
otherwise. We operationalize this approach by examining whether each of these three metrics 
is above the value of the top tercile: (1) the number of tweets posted in a year, (2) the average 
number of hashtags used in a tweet in a year, and (3) the percentage of directed tweets made in 
a year. A directed tweet is one that uses the @ function to establish a link with a high-profile 
account (e.g., an influential user such as Bill Gates, or another S&P 1500 company’s Twitter 
account). An example is “Thanks, @Delta for offering @SquawkStreet in flight. Makes trip 
go faster…” (tweeted by Karl McDonnell, CEO of Strayer Education on February 26, 2014). 
“Delta” has 1,317,490 followers on Twitter and “SquawkStreet” has 126,216 followers. We 
define high-profile accounts as those having more followers than the median value of all the 
accounts that are mentioned in the managers’ tweets.  
We next re-estimate Model (1) by replacing Twitter with High_Attention_Twitter and 
Low_Attention_Twitter. Our attention framework suggests that the coefficient on 
High_Attention_Twitter should be greater than that on Low_Attention_Twitter. The results in 
Table 5 indicate that the benefit of tweeting activity is significantly higher for managers who 
use attention-enhancing techniques.  
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VII. Outside Options and Career Development 
Prior Compensation Level  
We argue in the introduction that a labor market with limited attention may undervalue 
some managers. These individuals should derive more benefit if they can increase their 
notoriety. To investigate this conjecture, we divide our sample into terciles based on the 
residual value from Model (1) but excluding Twitter from the list of independent variables. The 
lower (higher) tercile includes observations for which under- (over) compensation is more 
probable. The results in Panel C of Table 3 are consistent with this view. We find that the 
benefits of tweeting on compensation accrue to the lowest tercile group. The coefficient on 
Twitter is positive and significant (the t-statistic equals 6.13). Being active on Twitter increases 
Comp by approximately 5% of its mean for underpaid executives. By contrast, we find no 
significant effect on the compensation of managers in the other two terciles (i.e., cases in which 
managers receive their expected level of compensation or higher). We even find that Twitter is 
negative and significant (the t-statistic equals -1.85) when we consider the highest decile 
(untabulated). These results show that tweeting is not a panacea for executive compensation 
and can explain why not all executives tweet. 
 
Systematic Process and Compensation Consulting 
We expect the effect of increased notoriety attention deficit to be more significant when 
the compensation design is less systematic. For example, we expect that low compensation is 
more likely to be due to the mispricing of human capital when the employer does not employ 
a consultant to set the compensation. Thus, the benefits of tweeting should be stronger in this 
case. To test this prediction, we create an indicator variable, NoConsult, equal to 1 if the current 
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employer hires a consultant to advise on the appropriate compensation, and zero otherwise.  
This variable is also based on the status in the year before initiating the activity on Twitter. We 
then interact this indicator variable with Twitter. The results presented in Panel D of Table 3 
are consistent with expectations. In addition, the untabulated results indicate that if the firm 
does employ a consultant, the “busyness” of the board increases the benefit of tweeting (Hauser 
2018).19  
 
Job Mobility 
We expect that if firms intend to retain managers who are active on social media 
because they appear more desirable, our results should be concentrated on those who can easily 
move to another firm. Managers with low job mobility would not garner as much interest, 
irrespective of their social media activity. We investigate this possibility by examining the 
effect of non-compete agreements. Gaimase (2011) shows that managers working in states that 
strongly enforce non-compete provisions are less likely to find jobs outside their current 
employers. Conversely, we expect managers who are subject to fewer non-compete restrictions 
to have higher labor market mobility and hence benefit more from Twitter activity.  
We classify managers as having fewer non-compete restrictions if they are located in 
states where the enforcement index of non-compete covenants in Ertimur et al. (2017) is below 
5 (9 being the strictest enforcement). We then re-estimate Model (1) by including an interaction 
term, High_Mobility × Twitter, and the standalone variable, High_Mobility, in each cross-
sectional test. We use the same set of control variables as those presented in Table 2. The results 
reported in Panel B of Table 4 are consistent with the predictions. The coefficient associated 
                                                          
19 We measure “busyness” by the average number of seats (private and public) held by the board members of a 
firm.   
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with the interaction between being active on Twitter and having greater mobility is positive 
and statistically significant (the t-statistics are equal to 2.25, respectively). On the other hand, 
we find the coefficient on Twitter per se is not significant, suggesting no discernable effect for 
managers with lower mobility. Again, the results also explain why not all executives tweet. 
 
Other Career Outcomes 
Next, we consider two other aspects of executive value: the number of directorship 
positions and promotions. First, we obtain the number of external board seats a manager holds 
from BoardEx. Serving on an outside board is an indicator of an observable executive’s career 
opportunities outside her current employer. We consider public and private companies 
separately because the search for directors of public companies should be more systematic and 
thus less prone to attention biases. We expect the effect of attention deficit to be more 
significant when searches are more ad hoc and thus that the benefits of tweeting should be 
stronger in a sample of private firms. Second, we use CEO as the dependent variable.   
The results reported in Table 4 support our expectations. Twitter is significant when we 
focus on the number of seats in private companies but not when we consider public companies. 
The difference between the two samples is significant at the 1% level (untabulated). Once a 
manager becomes active on Twitter, the number of external boards of private companies she 
serves on increases. Moreover, the results in Column 3 indicate that tweeting activity increases 
the likelihood of being promoted to be a CEO (the t-statistic equals 3.39).   
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VIII. Alternative Frameworks 
Effective Communication and Information Sharing  
The first alternative explanation for our limited attention framework is the notion that 
tweeting increases managers’ employer visibility and that tweeting managers are rewarded for 
doing so. Our tests rule out this explanation. First, the correlation between Twitter and 
Twitter_Firm is low (0.09). Our results hold when we control for firm fixed effects and for the 
tweeting activity of the firm (Panel A of Table 2). Second, the untabulated results indicate no 
significant association between managerial tweeting activity and the frequency of Google 
searches for a company. Third, our results are unaffected regardless of whether we control for 
a firm’s Google search volume or media coverage. Correlations between Twitter and these 
different measures of firm visibility are also very low (less than 0.1, untabulated). Fourth, 
personal tweets rarely mention the employer (3%, untabulated). Removing these rare cases 
does not affect our results. Fifth, it is not clear why executives would gain seats on private but 
not public boards in this context (Table 4). It is also unclear why under-searched executives 
would benefit more from tweeting, even though the potential impact on the firm should be 
lower (Table 3, Panel A, Column 2). 
A related alternative explanation is that tweets convey information about the firm and 
that executives are rewarded for their efforts to increase transparency or the disclosure quality 
of their firms. Different results suggest that this does not explain our findings. First, we 
consider many types of executives, including those not involved in financial reporting (such as 
COOs). The results in Panel A of Table 3 indicate that the effect of tweeting is stronger for 
executives who are not CEOs. In addition, our baseline results continue to hold after we exclude 
managers who hold a CFO title (untabulated). Second, as previously discussed, most tweets 
lack economic substance. The market reaction on tweeting days is not statistically different 
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from non-tweeting days. Kim and Meshke (2014), on the other hand, find significant market 
reactions when CEOs appear on CNBC, events that contain a great deal of firm-related 
information. Moreover, our results hold when we control for time-varying measures of 
corporate transparency, such as analyst forecast dispersion, analyst forecast errors, analyst 
following, bid-ask spread, and abnormal accruals (untabulated). They also hold when we 
control for CEO appearance on news articles and on CNBC (untabulated). Using Twitter and 
giving interviews on CNBC are statistically uncorrelated. Nevertheless, as discussed before, 
our results are not affected after deleting manager-years in which the tweets mention their 
employers. Finally, the majority of the tweeting managers in our sample do not have an active 
presence on other social media (e.g., Facebook and LinkedIn).20 Our results are not affected if 
we exclude managers who have an active presence both on Twitter and Facebook or LinkedIn. 
In sum, our additional analysis suggests that the findings of tweeting are robust to controlling 
for other channels that could also potentially increase attention.  
 
Bayesian Learning and Managerial Ability 
Another alternative possibility is that employers learned about the executive marginal 
productivity (or a skill that was previously undetected when the executive started tweeting). 
This explanation would be based on extracting information about the executive managerial 
productivity from the tweets, even though most tweets have little content. Different results are 
also inconsistent with this view. For example, Bayesian learning should exist along an 
executive’s career rather than suddenly materializing after the executive starts tweeting. In 
contrast, the time series test (Table 2, Panel B, Column 1) suggests that this learning, if any, 
                                                          
20 We follow a procedure identical to the one used for collecting data on managerial Twitter activity to examine 
whether a manager maintains an active account in LinkedIn or Facebook during our sample period.  
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does not happen before tweeting starts, but is very rapid once the executive initiates this activity. 
In addition, Bayesian learning is inconsistent with the fact that employers do not learn more 
from tweets that are more informative or are more employer-focused (the untabulated results 
discussed in Section V). Bayesian learning also does not provide a good justification for the 
facts that employers learn more when the secondary following of the executive is more focused 
(Table 2, Panel D, Column 2) or that outside private boards learn more from tweeting than 
outside public boards (Table 4, Columns 2 and 3). Finally, prior research (e.g., Graham, Li, 
and Qiu 2012) suggests that managerial skill is primarily a fixed effect. Our results (including 
the comparative statics) are robust to including these fixed effects. In light of these findings, 
this alternative explanation strikes us as implausible.  
Nevertheless, we investigate this possibility further using the findings of Milbourn 
(2003). This study argues that learning and beliefs formation by Bayesian market participants 
about a manager’s ability that is not directly observable translates into a positive relationship 
between stock-based pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) and managerial reputation. In contrast 
to Milbourn’s (2013) findings, we find the interaction terms between Twitter and either ROA 
or Return are statistically insignificant, but the main effect of Twitter is unaffected 
(untabulated). The untabulated results also show that we continue to find an insignificant 
association between PPS and Twitter activity when we use change in compensation as the 
dependent variable. This shows that the PPS is unaffected by the tweeting activity and is 
inconsistent with a Bayesian learning of managerial ability. Finally, our results are unaffected 
when we control for CEO tenure, media coverage, and firm performance, the proxies for 
managerial reputation, or the perception of managerial ability used in Milbourn (2003) 
(untabulated).  
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2966559 
38 
 
 
Governance 
Under the limited attention framework, we expect the market value of an executive to 
increase when there is greater public awareness of her existence, and such benefits should be 
more pronounced for underappreciated and mobile managers. However, Malmendier and Tate 
(2009) show that award-winning managers increase their entrenchment, extract more 
compensation, spend more time outside the firms, and underperform compared with their prior 
performance and peers. Such ex post value destruction, however, is mitigated if firms benefit 
from strong shareholder rights that facilitate the monitoring of these superstar managers.  
Our results are unlikely to be explained by rent extraction. First, the untabulated results 
fail to show a negative impact of Twitter on firm performance using various measures (e.g., 
ROA, sales growth, stock return, and assets turnover). Second, the benefits of Twitter activity 
do not decrease with the strength of corporate governance as proxied by institutional ownership 
(untabulated, Guo and Masulis 2015) or the E Index (Bebchuk, Cohen, and Farrell 2009). 
Finally, the untabulated results also indicate that Twitter use is uncorrelated with institutional 
ownership and is extremely weakly correlated with the E Index (-0.01). 
 
Mood and Expected Good News 
Another possibility is that tweeting captures a positive change in executive mood ahead 
of receiving good personal news. Again, different results suggest this possibility does not tie 
in with our findings. For example, it is not clear why tweeting would be associated with 
appointments on private boards but not on public ones, why tweeting would correlate more 
with increases in compensation only when executives are working in states with weak 
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enforcements of non-compete agreements, when they are under-searched in Google, when their 
followers are more focused, or when the executives are more effective in their tweeting. In 
addition, tweeting is uncorrelated with firm performance. If expected good news was the 
explanation, it is unclear why executives would not tweet more when their firms are doing well. 
 
IX. Conclusion 
We rely on the well-established theory of limited attention to investigate the effect of 
tweeting activity on managerial welfare. Limited attention refers to the idea that people have 
maximal cognitive capacity to absorb information and a limit on what they can pay attention 
to. Signals that are more noticeable should receive more weight in decision-making. Given that 
executive value is difficult to ascertain, we expect these biases to play a significant role in 
setting the managerial market value. Thus, we hypothesize that this value should increase when 
there is greater public awareness of an executive’s existence, particularly if she is otherwise 
underappreciated and compensation is not set systematically. We explore these predictions 
using a specific way to draw attention to an executive: tweeting.  
The results are largely consistent with our hypothesis. Initiating Twitter activity 
increases executive compensation. This finding is robust to a battery of econometric checks.  
A Monte Carlo simulation indicates that an omitted variable would have to be extremely 
correlated with our treatment variable to explain our results. The effect starts in the year of 
initial tweeting and increases afterward. The data display a parallel trend in the year prior to 
tweeting. The benefits are stronger when managers enjoy a larger, more focused, and more 
active audience. Our comparative statics also show that the effect of Twitter is stronger for 
executives who suffer from a pre-existing deficit of attention and who use attention-grabbing 
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Twitter techniques. Importantly, more informative tweets do not produce a greater benefit than 
uninformative tweets.  
Our results support that tweeting increases an executive’s outside opportunities, leading 
to a better bargaining position of tweeting executives. For example, we find the effect of 
Twitter is concentrated for executives who are underpaid, who are more able to realize outside 
opportunities, and who work for companies that are less systematic in their compensation 
approach (e.g., private boards, lack of compensation consultants). In addition to increased 
compensation, these managers are also able to secure more seats on boards and more likely to 
be promoted. Again, the positive effect on the probability of obtaining additional board seats 
is concentrated in private companies. Our findings also suggest that not all executives have 
incentives to tweet.  Finally, different tests (discussed in Section VIII) rule out alternative 
explanations, such as Bayesian learning about managerial ability.  
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Panel A. Descriptive Statistics 
  N Mean Std. Dev.  Median 
Twitter 16,260 0.015 0.124 0.000 
Comp 16,260 7.982 1.180 8.058 
Size 16,260 7.712 1.687 7.655 
ROA 16,260 0.037 0.103 0.047 
MTB 16,260 1.803 1.030 1.472 
Return 16,260 0.165 0.467 0.125 
RetVolt 16,260 0.105 0.059 0.091 
Tenure 16,260 6.449 6.967 4.000 
CEO 16,260 0.788 0.409 1.000 
 
Panel B. Correlations Matrix with Spearman (Pearson) Correlations on the Upper (Lower) Diagonal 
 Twitter Comp Size ROA MTB Return RetVolt Tenure CEO 
Twitter  0.02* -0.03*** 0.00 0.06*** 0.03*** 0.00 0.05*** 0.03*** 
Comp 0.02*  0.61*** 0.16*** 0.12*** 0.10*** -0.26*** 0.10*** 0.20*** 
Size -0.02** 0.52***  -0.01 -0.17*** 0.02** -0.39*** -0.08*** -0.11*** 
ROA 0.01 0.16*** 0.13***  0.61*** 0.19*** -0.25*** 0.00 -0.01 
MTB 0.07*** 0.02* -0.21*** 0.35***  0.33*** -0.20*** 0.04*** 0.02** 
Return 0.03*** 0.05*** -0.03*** 0.19*** 0.25***  -0.14*** 0.04*** 0.00 
RetVolt -0.01 -0.20*** -0.32*** -0.34*** -0.13*** 0.03***  -0.01 0.02* 
Tenure 0.03*** 0.00 -0.08*** 0.01 0.03*** 0.03*** -0.02*  0.45*** 
CEO 0.03*** 0.17*** -0.11*** 0.00 0.04*** 0.01 0.01 0.29***  
 
This table presents descriptive statistics (panel A) and correlations for variables (panel B) used in the empirical 
analysis. The variables are defined as follows: Twitter is an indicator variable, taking the value of 1 if a manager 
has an active Twitter account in place by the end of year t and 0 otherwise. Comp is the natural logarithm of the 
total annual compensation a manager obtains in a given year. The annual compensation includes the manager’s 
salary, bonuses, other annual compensation, the total value of restricted stock granted, the fair value of stock 
options granted, long-term incentive payouts, and all other pay. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets in place. 
ROA is the income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets. MTB is the market value divided by the book 
value of the firm’s asset. Return is the annual stock return calculated using monthly returns from CRSP. RetVolt 
is the standard deviation of a firm’s stock return. Tenure is the number of years the manager has been a CEO. 
CEO is an indicator variable, taking the value of 1 if a manager is currently serving as a CEO and 0 otherwise. 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 two-tailed levels, respectively.  
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Table 2 Executive Compensation and Twitter Activity 
Panel A. Baseline Results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dep. Var. = Comp 
 OLS EB 
  
Coeff.  
(t-stat.) 
Coeff. 
 (t-stat.) 
Coeff.  
(t-stat.) 
Coeff.  
(t-stat.) 
Coeff.  
(t-stat.) 
Coeff.  
(t-stat.) 
Coeff.  
(t-stat.) 
Twitter 0.172*** 0.190*** 0.191*** 0.095** 0.096** 0.214*** 0.140*** 
 (3.12) (3.61) (3.63) (2.28) (2.29) (6.00) (4.25) 
Twitter_Firm   -0.026  -0.010   
   (-1.20)  (-0.43) 
  
Size 0.348*** 0.354*** 0.354*** 0.299*** 0.299*** 0.394*** 0.323*** 
 (12.53) (13.01) (13.05) (12.23) (12.23) (8.19) (5.17) 
ROA 0.487*** 0.451*** 0.452*** 0.474*** 0.474*** 0.390 0.365 
 
(5.51) (5.26) (5.24) (4.65) (4.64) (1.56) (1.39) 
MTB 0.094*** 0.098*** 0.098*** 0.077*** 0.077*** 0.064* 0.019 
 (6.01) (6.69) (6.69) (5.73) (5.73) (1.97) (0.32) 
Return 0.068*** 0.061*** 0.062*** 0.071*** 0.072*** 0.091*** 0.130*** 
 (3.30) (3.13) (3.17) (3.59) (3.59) (3.49) (2.90) 
RetVolt -0.517** -0.458** -0.456** -0.419** -0.418** -0.820** -0.918** 
 (-2.68) (-2.67) (-2.67) (-2.23) (-2.23) (-2.54) (-2.31) 
Tenure 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.022* -0.022* 0.003 0.012 
 (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (-2.00) (-2.00) (0.56) (0.42) 
CEO 0.626*** 0.627*** 0.627*** 0.528*** 0.528*** 0.521*** 0.491*** 
 (25.94) (26.18) (26.22) (18.23) (18.23) (11.59) (11.88) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No 
Year FE Yes No No Yes Yes No Yes 
Industry x Year FE No Yes Yes No No Yes No 
Manager FE No No No Yes Yes No Yes 
N 16,138 16,138 16,138 16,016 16,016 16,138 16,016 
Adj. R-sq.  0.73 0.73 0.73 0.76 0.76 0.86 0.86 
            
This Panel reports the baseline results based on Model (1). Columns (1)–(5) report estimation results based on OLS. Columns (6) and 
(7) report the estimation results based on the entropy balancing (EB) method. t-statistics are based on robust standard errors corrected 
for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the industry level. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2 (Cont’d) 
Panel B. Trend and Change Specifications 
 (1) (2) 
Dep. Var. = Comp 
  OLS GMM 
 Coeff. (t-stat.) Coeff. (t-stat.) 
Pre2 0.088  
 (1.32)  
Pre1 0.001  
 (0.02)  
Post0 0.113* 
 
 (1.83)  
Post1 0.221*** 
 
 (3.33)  
Post2+ 0.169** 
 
 (2.57)  
Twitter  0.072* 
  (1.90) 
Lag_Comp  0.189*** 
  (6.52) 
Size 0.354*** 0.260*** 
 (13.07) (8.48) 
ROA 0.448*** 0.355*** 
 (5.20) (4.10) 
MTB 0.098*** 0.082*** 
 (6.69) (4.91) 
Return 0.061*** 0.031* 
 (3.13) (1.91) 
RetVolt -0.467*** 0.032 
 (-2.72) (0.18) 
Tenure 0.001 -0.008 
 (0.14) (-1.37) 
CEO 0.627*** 0.415*** 
 (26.25) (14.04) 
Firm FE Yes Yes 
Industry x Year FE Yes Yes 
N 16,138 12,845 
Adj. R-sq. 0.73 -- 
This panel reports the results of trend and other falsifiable analyses. Pre<j> (Post<j>) is an indicator variable 
that takes the value of 1 for j years before (after) a manager opens her Twitter account and 0 otherwise. Post2+ is 
a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if it is two years or more after a manager opens her Twitter account. 
Lag_Comp is the Comp in year t-1. All other variables are defined in Table 1. t-statistics are based on robust 
standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the industry level. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2 (Cont’d) 
Panel C. Instrumental Variable (IV) Analysis 
  (1) (2) 
Dep. Var. = Comp 
  Coeff. (z-stat.) Coeff. (z-stat.) 
^Twitter 0.217** 0.193** 
 (2.56) (2.26) 
Size 0.199** 0.199** 
 (2.47) (2.47) 
ROA 0.748*** 0.748*** 
 (4.21) (4.21) 
MTB 0.159*** 0.159*** 
 (6.04) (6.04) 
Return 0.050** 0.050** 
 (2.46) (2.46) 
RetVolt 0.196 0.194 
 (0.45) (0.45) 
Tenure -0.002 -0.002 
 (-0.36) (-0.36) 
CEO 0.599*** 0.599*** 
 (17.96) (17.95) 
Firm FE Yes Yes 
Industry x Year FE Yes Yes 
Hansen J Stat. (p-value) 0.808 0.765 
Cragg-Donald Wald F Stat. 916.554 899.062 
N 16,138 16,138 
Centered R-sq. 0.17 0.17 
This panel reports the results of instrumental variable (IV) analysis. Twitter_Popularity is the percentage of 
managers on our final list who use Twitter accounts in a state in the beginning of a year. We re-estimate our 
baseline model using the instrumented value of Twitter, which we label ^Twitter. Column (1) reports the results 
of our second-stage regression based on a two-stage approach and the Lewbel (2012) procedure to generate 
instrumental variables other than Twitter_Popularity.  Column (2) reports the results of our third-stage regression 
based on Wooldridge’s (2010) three-stage approach and the Lewbel (2012) procedure to generate instrumental 
variables other than Twitter_Popularity. t(z)-statistics are based on robust standard errors corrected for 
heteroscedasticity and clustered at the industry level. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
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Table 2 (Cont’d) 
Panel D: Effect of Twitter Audience 
  (1) (2) 
Dep. Var. = Comp 
 Number of followers Focused following 
  Coeff. (t-stat.) Coeff. (t-stat.) 
High_Twitter 0.329*** 0.251*** 
 (5.96) (4.73) 
Low_Twitter 0.116* 0.127* 
 (1.94) (1.98) 
Size 0.353*** 0.354*** 
 (13.02) (12.99) 
ROA 0.451*** 0.450*** 
 (5.28) (5.24) 
MTB 0.098*** 0.098*** 
 (6.73) (6.64) 
Tenure 0.061*** 0.061*** 
 (3.14) (3.11) 
Return -0.458** -0.458** 
 (-2.67) (-2.66) 
RetVolt 0.001 0.001 
 (0.15) (0.14) 
CEO 0.626*** 0.626*** 
 (26.15) (26.11) 
Firm FE Yes Yes 
Industry x Year FE Yes Yes 
N 16,138 16,138 
Adj. R-sq.  0.73 0.73 
Test of High_Twitter = Low_Twitter:  
F-stat. 6.35** 3.07* 
This panel reports the effect of Twitter following. High (Low)_Twitter equals 1 if a manager with Twitter in place 
(Twitter=1) obtains high (low) following from the Twitter users and 0 otherwise. We define a high (or low) Twitter 
following based on (1) the number of followers of a Twitter manager (Column 1), and (2) whether a Twitter 
manager’s followers are focused (Column 2). t-statistics are based on robust standard errors corrected for 
heteroscedasticity and clustered at the industry level. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
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Table 3 Comparative Statics 
Panel A. Attention Deficit 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dep. Var. = Comp 
 Attention_Deficit = Not a CEO  
Low  
Google Search  
Frequency 
Shorter  
Executive  
Experience 
  Coeff. (t-stat.) Coeff. (t-stat.) Coeff. (t-stat.) 
Attention_Deficit × Twitter 0.514*** 0.173** 0.101* 
 (3.07) (2.51) (1.92) 
Twitter 0.205*** 0.134*** 0.106** 
 (5.35) (3.00) (2.08) 
Attention_Deficit  -0.567*** -0.044** -0.027 
 (-6.58) (-2.31) (-0.94) 
Size 0.330*** 0.354*** 0.353*** 
 (10.42) (12.87) (13.00) 
ROA 0.526*** 0.451*** 0.451*** 
 (5.67) (5.19) (5.27) 
MTB 0.100*** 0.098*** 0.098*** 
 (6.49) (6.78) (6.71) 
Return 0.063*** 0.062*** 0.061*** 
 (3.22) (3.14) (3.12) 
RetVolt -0.423** -0.457** -0.457** 
 (-2.31) (-2.65) (-2.67) 
Tenure 0.013*** 0.001 0.000 
 (2.85) (0.11) (0.03) 
CEO  0.625*** 0.625*** 
  (26.29) (26.44) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes 
Industry x Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
N 16,138 16,138 16,138 
Adj. R-sq. 0.69 0.73 0.73 
    
This panel reports the results of comparative statics tests based on attention deficit and education. 
Attention_Deficit is an indicator variable equal to 1 if either (1) a manager is not the CEO, (2) the Google search 
volume index of a manager is lower than the cut-off value for the top tercile, or (3) the number of years working 
in a firm is lower than the cut-off value for the top tercile, and 0 otherwise. All three variables are based on the 
status in the year before the initiation of the activity on Twitter. All other variables are defined in Table 1. t-
statistics are based on robust standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the industry level. ∗, 
∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.   
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Table 3 (Cont’d) 
Panel B. Tweeting for Attention 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dep. Var. = Comp 
  
Number of  
tweets 
Usage of  
hashtags 
Frequency of  
directed tweets 
  Coeff. (t-stat.) Coeff. (t-stat.) Coeff. (t-stat.) 
High_Attention_Twitter 0.331*** 0.261*** 0.301*** 
 (12.34) (4.48) (5.07) 
Low_Attention_Twitter 0.186*** 0.180*** 0.179*** 
 (4.96) (3.60) (3.54) 
Size 0.353*** 0.354*** 0.353*** 
 (12.99) (13.02) (13.02) 
ROA 0.451*** 0.451*** 0.450*** 
 (5.25) (5.25) (5.25) 
MTB 0.098*** 0.098*** 0.098*** 
 (6.61) (6.68) (6.68) 
Return 0.061*** 0.062*** 0.061*** 
 (3.13) (3.13) (3.14) 
RetVolt -0.459** -0.459** -0.459** 
 (-2.67) (-2.67) (-2.67) 
Tenure 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) 
CEO 0.626*** 0.627*** 0.627*** 
 (26.16) (26.17) (26.17) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes 
Industry x Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
N 16,138 16,138 16,138 
Adj. R-sq. 0.73 0.73 0.73 
Test of High_Attention_Twitter = Low_Attention_Twitter:  
F-stat. 33.04*** 4.73* 7.48*** 
 
This panel reports cross-sectional tests of the attention of Twitter users. High_Attention_Twitter (Low_ 
Attention_Twitter) equals 1 if a manager with Twitter in place (Twitter=1) obtains high (low) attention from 
Twitter users and 0 otherwise. We define high (or low) attention as (1) the number of tweets made by a manager 
in a year (column (1)), (2) the average number of hashtags (“#”) used in a tweet made by a manager in a year 
(column (2)), and (3) the number of directed tweets (column 3). All other variables are defined in Table 1. t-
statistics are based on robust standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the industry level. ∗, 
∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Table 3 (Cont’d) 
Panel C. Prior Compensation Level 
  (1) (3) 
Dep. Var. = Comp 
 Low Others 
  Coeff. (t-stat.) Coeff. (t-stat.) 
Twitter 0.379*** 0.041 
 (6.13) (0.94) 
Size 0.321*** 0.332*** 
 (4.54) (12.84) 
ROA 0.765*** 0.375*** 
 (2.81) (4.90) 
MTB 0.042* 0.116*** 
 (1.76) (8.98) 
Return 0.157*** 0.029 
 (5.09) (1.64) 
RetVolt -0.890*** -0.172 
 (-3.95) (-1.03) 
Tenure -0.015 0.006*** 
 (-1.09) (3.16) 
CEO 0.690*** 0.549*** 
 (12.31) (27.31) 
Firm FE Yes Yes 
Industry x Year FE Yes Yes 
N 4,674 11,330 
Adj. R-sq. 0.68 0.72 
   
This panel presents the results of comparative statics tests based on prior pay level. We divide our sample into 
terciles, “Low,” and “Others,” based on the residual value from the following model. “Low” represent the bottom 
tercile and “Others” represent the middle and upper terciles. The baseline model is  
Comp = α0 + α1Size + α1ROA+ α2MTB+ α3Return + α4RetVolt + α5Tenure + α6CEO+ Year FE + ε 
All other variables are defined in Table 1. t-statistics are based on robust standard errors corrected for 
heteroscedasticity and clustered at the industry level. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
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Table 3 (Cont’d) 
Panel D. Systematic Process 
  
Dep. Var. = Comp 
  Coeff. (t-stat.) 
NoConsult × Twitter 0.310* 
 (1.81) 
Twitter 0.176*** 
 (3.32) 
NoConsult 0.015 
 (0.98) 
Size 0.354*** 
 (13.06) 
ROA 0.449*** 
 (5.29) 
MTB 0.099*** 
 (6.79) 
Return 0.061*** 
 (3.12) 
RetVolt -0.458** 
 (-2.67) 
Tenure 0.001 
 (0.15) 
CEO 0.627*** 
 (26.20) 
Firm FE Yes 
Industry x Year FE Yes 
N 16,138 
Adj. R-sq. 0.73 
  
This panel reports the results of comparative statics tests based on compensation consulting. NoConsult is an 
indicator variable equal to 1 if the current employer has not hired a compensation consultant, and 0 otherwise. 
This variable is calculated based on the status in the year before the initiation of the activity on Twitter. All other 
variables are defined in Table 1. t-statistics are based on robust standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity 
and clustered at the industry level. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 3 (Cont’d) 
Panel E. Job Mobility 
  (1) 
Dep. Var. = Comp 
  Coeff. (t-stat.) 
High_Mobility × Twitter 0.153** 
 (2.25) 
Twitter 0.076 
 (0.98) 
High_Mobility 0.026 
 (0.33) 
Size 0.353*** 
 (12.98) 
ROA 0.451*** 
 (5.25) 
MTB 0.098*** 
 (6.74) 
Return 0.061*** 
 (3.08) 
RetVolt -0.457** 
 (-2.65) 
Tenure 0.001 
 (0.14) 
CEO 0.627*** 
 (26.17) 
Firm FE Yes 
Industry x Year FE Yes 
N 16,138 
Adj. R-sq. 0.73 
  
This panel reports the results of comparative statics tests based on job mobility. High_Mobility is an indicator 
variable that represents weak non-compete provision enforcement. High_Mobility equals 1 if a manager works 
for a firm located in a state with the score of the enforcement index for non-compete covenants (reported in 
Ertimur et al. (2017)) is below 5 and 0 otherwise. All other variables are defined in Table 1. t-statistics are based 
on robust standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the industry level. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4 Other Career Outcomes and Twitter Activity 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dep. Var. = Seats CEO 
  Private Publicly listed  
  Coeff. (t-stat.) Coeff. (t-stat.) Coeff. (t-stat.) 
Twitter -0.002 0.061* 0.620*** 
 (-0.05) (1.73) (3.39) 
Size -0.009 0.023** -0.062 
 (-0.68) (2.32) (-1.03) 
ROA -0.014 -0.041* 0.542*** 
 (-0.52) (-1.93) (3.50) 
MTB 0.002 0.003 0.006 
 (0.45) (0.58) (0.24) 
Return -0.006 -0.003 0.020 
 (-1.08) (-0.65) (0.87) 
RetVolt 0.094* 0.090** 0.319 
 (1.68) (1.98) (1.07) 
Tenure 0.012*** 0.004*** 0.080*** 
 (6.26) (2.99) (11.49) 
CEO 0.165*** 0.020**  
 (13.82) (2.19)  
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes 
Industry x Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
N 16,138 16,138 16,138 
Adj. R-sq. 0.62 0.65 0.11 
    
This table examines the impact of Twitter activity on other aspects of manager welfare- or career-related outcomes: 
the probability of promotion to CEO, and number of directorship. Column (1) reports the estimation results of a 
CRE probit model. Columns (2) and (3) report the results based on Model (1) using the dependent variables Seats. 
Seats is measured by the natural logarithm of 1 plus the number of boards of public or private companies a manager 
serves on. All other variables are defined in Table 1. t(z)-statistics are based on robust standard errors corrected 
for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the industry level. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively. 
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Appendix A Summary Statistics of the Entropy Balancing Procedure 
 
  Tweeting Mangers Non-Tweeting Managers 
        Before balancing After balancing 
  Mean Variance Skewness Mean Variance Skewness Mean Variance Skewness 
Size 7.159 3.073 0.616 7.716 2.820 0.186 7.146 3.072 0.638 
ROA 0.046 0.012 -1.980 0.037 0.011 -2.256 0.046 0.013 -1.977 
MTB 2.410 1.930 0.955 1.788 1.026 2.228 2.411 1.929 0.953 
Return 0.253 0.173 0.899 0.163 0.219 1.120 0.253 0.173 0.897 
RetVolt 0.100 0.002 1.342 0.105 0.004 1.726 0.100 0.002 1.353 
Tenure 8.753 48.370 1.147 6.425 48.430 1.538 8.748 48.350 1.148 
CEO 0.941 0.056 -3.738 0.787 0.168 -1.398 0.940 0.056 -3.718 
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Appendix B Some Examples of Tweets 
 
 
Executive Name Twitter Account Tweet Date Tweet Detail 
    
Karl McDonnell @Karl_McDonnell 8 Feb 2011 
Just signed up for Twitter....looking forward 
to writing about all sorts of useless things.... 
Karl McDonnell @Karl_McDonnell 24 Jan 2012 
Great to hear @jack_welch and 
@SuzyWelch have joined Reuters and 
Fortune for a new weekly column.  
#leadership #management @fortune 
Karl McDonnell @Karl_McDonnell 1 Feb 2012 
Chicago at sunset, looking north along 
Lake Michigan.  #photography #landscapes 
Karl McDonnell @Karl_McDonnell 5 Oct 2012 
@darrenrovell Thanks for sharing.  GREAT 
video.  #mlb #baseball #playoffs 
   
 
 
Mark T. Bertolini @mtbert 15 Sep 2009 @MsLaurenRae sorry i missed the ride! 
Mark T. Bertolini @mtbert 14 Oct 2011 
@FdoAguirreCEO one game at a time! 
#Tigers #ALCS 
Mark T. Bertolini @mtbert 24 Jan 2012 
Snow, snow and more snow...it's all over 
here USA! #Davos #WEF 
Mark T. Bertolini @mtbert 26 Feb 2012 
Hey man, a very Happy Birthday to 
@TheClothier! All the blessings of family, 
friends and the Creator on this special day. 
Do good things:) 
   
 
 
Patrick Decker @PatrickKDecker 30 Aug 2014 
Bang head against wall in Berlin!  Great 
day of galleries.  #berlin 
Patrick Decker @PatrickKDecker 13 Sep 2014 
@SwimOutDaily thanks Angel!   And 
here's to swimming out to meet our ships 
rather than waiting for them to come to us!! 
Patrick Decker @PatrickKDecker 4 Oct 2014 
Nothing like #loud neighbors inviting you 
to a #Housewarming #party that drowns out 
your stereo in your own home.  Very nice 
touch. 
Patrick Decker @PatrickKDecker 14 Apr 2014 
#RIP a #magician 
#whenamanlovesawoman @NYMag: Soul 
singer Percy Sledge has died at 73 
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